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INTRODUCTION'
Administrative agencies increasingly rely on technology to pro-
mote the substantive goals they are charged to pursue. The Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services has prioritized digitized personal
health data as a means for improving patient safety and reducing bu-
reaucratic costs.2 The DOJ hosts electronic databases that pool infor-
mation between agencies to facilitate national law enforcement in
ways previously unimaginable.' The Departments of Defense and
Education mine digital information to effect goals as diverse as hu-
man resources management; service improvement; fraud, waste, and
abuse control; and detection of terrorist activity.'
The use of technology to achieve the principal purposes set forth
in agency enabling statutes-health, security, or education, for exam-
ple-has significant consequences for other public goals. Specifically,
the digital collection of personally identifiable information renders
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manuscript, 2007), funded by the Rose Foundation for Communities and the Environment and
by TRUST (Team for Research in Ubiquitous Secure Technology), which receives support from
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2 See Department of Health and Human Services, Harnessing Information Technology to
Improve Health Care 1 (May 6,2004), online at http://www.providersedge.com/ehdocs/ehr-articles/
HarnessingInformationTechnology-toImproveHealthCare.pdf (visited Jan 12, 2008) (pro-
viding an overview of opportunities to improve health care through technology).
3 See, for example, FBI, IAFIS: Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System,
online at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/iafishtm (visited Jan 12,2008) (detailing the technology behind
a national fingerprint and criminal history system maintained by the FBI).
4 See GAO, Data Mining: Federal Efforts Cover a Wide Range of Uses, GAO-04-548, 2-3
(May 2004), online at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dO4548.pdf (visited Jan 12, 2008) (reporting
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that data subject to the immense search and aggregation powers of
technology systems, increases the capacity for repurposing and reuse,
and provides increasingly attractive targets to hackers bent on misuse.
These phenomena raise serious concerns about a surveillance capacity
that can erode personal privacy.
The digitization of administration, then, raises the question of
how to ensure that decisions about the use of technology in public
management reflect not only the direct mandates with which particu-
lar agencies and administrators are specifically charged, but also po-
litical and social commitments to universal privacy concerns.
Recognizing that the "rapid evolution of information technology
has raised questions about whether personal information is ade-
quately protected,"5 Congress, in the E-Government Act of 2002,6 re-
quired administrative agencies to conduct privacy impact assessments
(PIAs) when developing or procuring information technology systems
that include personally identifiable information.' The Office of Man-
agement and Budget (OMB) guidance promulgated pursuant to the
statute mandates that PIAs include a risk assessment that specifically
identifies and evaluates potential threats to individual privacy, dis-
cusses alternatives, identifies appropriate risk mitigation measures,
and articulates the rationale for the final design choice.8 0MB Direc-
tor Joshua Bolten issued requirements of considerable institutional
breadth-the process would influence decisions not only across agen-
cies, regardless of primary mission, but also in the executive branch
and by federal contractors. 9 Further, the requirement applies both to
new technology systems and to "new privacy risks" created when
changing existing systems.
Despite this new privacy requirement, adherence to privacy man-
dates across agencies-and even between programs within a single
agency-is highly inconsistent. In this paper, we engage in an initial
exploration into the explanation for the PIA requirement's uneven
success in making agencies incorporate privacy concerns into technol-
ogy decisions.
5 Great Falls Historic District Study Act of 2001, S Rep No 107-74, 107th Cong, 2d Sess 8
(2002).
6 Pub L No 107-347,116 Stat 2899.
7 44 USC § 3501 note (2000 & Supp 2002) (requiring agencies to conduct a PIA before
"developing or procuring information technology that collects, maintains, or disseminates infor-
mation that is in an identifiable form").
8 See OMB, OMB Guidance for Implementing the Privacy Provisions of the E-Government
Act of 2002, M-03-22 (Sept 26, 2003), online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/m03-
22.html (visited Jan 12,2008).
9 See id.
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The record of inconsistency suggests the insufficiency of decision
process requirements alone to ensure the uniform inclusion of privacy
objectives in policymaking. This suggestion seems especially salient
given that privacy is a secondary concern for agencies and frequently
in tension with their primary mandates.
It also underscores the contextual contingency of political over-
sight as a means for ensuring uniform control of delegated discretion.
These accountability shortcomings, we argue, are particularly relevant
in light of two characteristics of the privacy context: the political sensi-
tivity inherent in the public promotion of privacy and the enhanced
barriers to transparency in decisions about technology. As to the for-
mer, privacy remains contested when compared to the interests
against which it is frequently juxtaposed-physical security and ad-
ministrative efficiency. This can create strong disincentives for politi-
cally accountable actors to promote its protection in specific policy
choices.' As to the latter, discussions about choices between informa-
tion systems are frequently cloaked in either the inaccessible idiom of
technology or the disinterested language of bureaucracy, both of
which may create practical barriers to effective advocacy and oversight.
Having suggested limits to traditional means of external oversight
in the privacy context, we explore what factors might, by contrast,
promote the consideration of privacy. To that end, we examine the
implementation of the PIA requirement by two different federal
agencies considering the adoption of a single technology: radio fre-
quency identification (RFID), which allows a data chip-one that can
be accessed remotely by wireless technology-to be attached to or
inserted into a product, animal, or person.
The first agency, the Department of State (DOS), proposed a rule
incorporating RFID technology into US passports. Its one and one-
half page "e-Passport" PIA, consisting of seven paragraphs, failed to
discuss the technical aspects of the program, alternative technologies,
risks, or their mitigation. The program was ultimately adopted with
significant modifications amidst criticism as to its security vulnerabili-
ties and privacy risks.
10 The unwillingness of Congress to require the Administration to comply with the re-
quirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), Pub L No 95-511, 92 Stat 1783,
codified as amended at 50 USCA § 1801 et seq (2007), and its likely decision to retrospectively
immunize the telecommunications providers who aided the government in its illegal surveillance
program, exemplify this problem and highlight the particular strain domestic terrorism places on
privacy oversight by politicians.
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By contrast, the PIAs produced by the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) during its adoption of the same technology" in the
United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
(US-VISIT) program contained forty-eight single-spaced pages. The
assessment detailed the system architecture, privacy threats and miti-
gation methods, an explanation of their design choice, and a plan for
implementing any necessary additional privacy and security measures
on an ongoing basis. The program, as proposed and adopted, reflected
these assessments.
2
Comparing our two cases suggests the importance of internal
agency structure, culture, personnel, and professional expertise as im-
portant mechanisms for ensuring bureaucratic accountability to the
secondary privacy mandate imposed by Congress. Building on litera-
ture identifying and documenting factors that contribute to successful
data protection efforts, our case study explores the relationship be-
tween independence, agency culture, expertise, alternative forms of
external oversight, interest group engagement, and the management
of privacy commitments within federal agencies.
11 The particular standards used varied (e-Passport ISO 14443, US-VISIT) but the basic
technology is the same.
12 Section 7208(d) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 re-
quired US-VIS1T to collect biometric exit data from all individuals who are required to provide
biometric entry data. Pub L No 108-458, 118 Stat 3638, 3819, codified at 8 USC § 1365b(d) (Supp
2004). In response, DHS proposed Increment 2C, which intended to use passive RFID tags em-
bedded in the 1-94 arrival/departure form to track entry and exit of foreign visitors at land bor-
der Point Of Entry crossings. DHS, Notice of Privacy Act System of Records, 70 Fed Reg 38699,
38699-700 (2005). The embedded tag stored no personally identifiable data; instead, each tag
contained a unique identifier that was linked to a traveler's information in the US-VISIT data-
base. Id at 38700. DHS conducted a feasibility study (final report issued January 21, 2005) and
commenced testing of the proposed system. See GAO, Homeland Security: Prospects for Biomet-
ric US-VISIT Exit Capability Remain Unclear, GAO-07-1044T, 10 (June 28. 2007), online at http://
homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20070628154223-99040.pdf (visited Jan 12, 2008) (pointing
to reliability problems in tests of the proposed system at five points of entry); DHS, US-VISIT
Increment 2C RFID Feasibility Study: Final Report (Jan 21, 2005), online at http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/foia/US-VISIT RFIDfeasibility-redacted-051106.pdf (visited Jan 12, 2008) (pro-
posing recommendations based upon the feasibility study). A GAO report issued in January
2007 noted that in addition to technical deficiencies with the proposed system, "the technology
that had been tested cannot meet a key goal of US-VISIT-ensuring that visitors who enter the
country are the same ones who leave." GAO, Border Security: US- VISIT Program Faces Strate-
gic, Operational, and Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry, GAO-07-378T, 21 (Jan
2007), online at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07378t.pdf (visited Jan 12,2008).
DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff announced in February 2007 while testifying before the
House Homeland Security Committee that DHS was abandoning the program due to its inabil-
ity to meet its primary objective of identifying the flow of 1-94 carriers across borders. See Cher-
toff: RFID Program to Be Abandoned, UPI (February 9, 2007). The authors believe the intense
examination of the program's objective, performance, and risks that led to its abandonment was
greatly facilitated by the PIA process and the ongoing examination and attention to the privacy
and security issues posed by the program by the Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee,
Congress, and the public.
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We hope that this early analysis proves interesting for debates in
both public administration and privacy protection. In particular, we
consider ways in which these early and limited experiences with PIAs
might speak to the debate on the efficacy of external controls on bu-
reaucracy, and to the less-developed literature seeking to open the
"black box" of administrative decisionmaking by exploring the struc-
tural, organizational, and human factors at work within agencies. As to
privacy, we believe these early experiences provide insight into pre-
conditions necessary to advance privacy commitments through admin-
istrative structures in the face of social and bureaucratic pressures to
manage risk by acquiring information about individuals. Finally, we
suggest implications for specific proposals for policy reform intended
to promote agency accountability to privacy goals.
I. PRIVACY MANDATES AND INCONSISTENT IMPLEMENTATION
A. The PIA Mandate
In the face of increased digitization of information, Congress in-
cluded the PIA requirement in the 2002 E-Government Act. The PIA
provisions mandated, in the words of the bill's Senate report, that agen-
cies publicly "explain"-by means of a PIA-how they "take[] into
account privacy considerations when purchasing and creating new in-
formation systems, and when initiating collections of information."'3
"[Tlhe greater personalization of government services," the report con-
tinued, "need not impinge on personal privacy, if the federal government
takes steps to address privacy concerns when first designing systems.".
The PIA provisions augmented the approach of the Privacy Act
of 1974,5 which relies principally on notice as the procedural mecha-
nism for safeguarding personally identifiable records." That law pro-
hibits agencies, in most instances, from disclosing personal records
beyond the "routine use" for which they were collected without writ-
ten consent from the individual to whom the records pertained." Im-
plementation of its recordkeeping and safeguarding requirements was
assigned largely to midlevel agency employees responsible for other
13 S Rep No 107-74 at 28-29 (cited in note 5).
14 Id at 28 (addressing one of two major concerns in privacy policy, the other being clarity
of privacy notices).
15 Pub L No 93-579,88 Stat 1896, codified as amended at 5 USC § 552a (2000 & Supp 2004).
16 Specifically, the Act governs records contained in a "system of records," which includes
"a group of any records under the control of any agency from which information is retrieved by
the name of the individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular
assigned to the individual." 5 USC § 552a(a)(5).
17 See 5 USC § 552a(b).
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tasks besides the privacy function. 8 Furthermore, the "routine use"
exemption has been broadly construed in practice, constraining the
1974 Act's effectiveness as a meaningful constraint on the repurposing
and sharing of personal information. 9
The E-Government Act, by contrast, continued a shift towards
greater institutionalization of privacy concerns initiated by the Clinton
Administration, which had both directed executive departments and
agencies to "designate a senior official within the agency to assume
primary responsibility for privacy policy,"' and appointed a "chief
counselor for privacy," within OMB.2' The Act created additional deci-
sionmaking process requirements, specifically that PIAs be conducted
prior to the adoption of new technology, that they be reviewed by an
agency's chief information officer or equivalent official, and that they
be made available to the public online if "practicable."22 It directed
OMB to establish guidelines to ensure that PIAs are commensurate
with the size of the information system, the sensitivity of information,
and the privacy risk. That guidance mandated that PIAs, in addition
to providing a public description of the system, contain a risk assess-
ment that specifically identifies and evaluates potential threats to in-
dividual privacy, discusses alternatives and identifies appropriate risk
mitigation measures for each, articulates the rationale for the final
design, and identifies what choices the agency made "as a result of
performing the PIA."2 The guidance further provides that PIAs be
submitted to OMB as part of the agency budget review process."
18 See 5 USC § 552a(e)(3)-(4),(6).
19 See, for example, Paul M. Schwartz and Joel R. Reidenberg, Data Privacy Law 95-100
(1996) (discussing federal agencies' broad interpretation of the routine use exception and the
limited effectiveness of courts in constraining these interpretations).
20 White House, Memorandum on Privacy and Personal Information in Federal Records, 34
Weekly Comp Pres Doc 870,871 (May 14,1998), online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoran-
da/m99-05-a.html (visited Jan 12,2008).
21 See White House, Press Release, The Clinton-Gore Plan for Financial Privacy and Con-
sumer Protection in the 21st Century (May 4, 1999), online at http://clinton6.nara.gov/1999/05/1999-
05-04-proposal-summary-on-financial-privacy-and-consumer-protection.html (visited Jan 12,2008).
22 See 44 USC § 3501 note.
23 See id.
24 See OMB, Guidance at 4 (cited in note 8). The guidance further specified that PIA re-
quirements apply not just to new information systems, but also when systems are converted from
paper-based to electronic, when anonymous information is converted to an identifiable form, and
when new uses of an existing IT system arise, including application of new technologies that
significantly change how information is managed.
25 See id at 1 (imposing a deadline for PIAs for purposes of budgetary requests).
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B. Inconsistent Implementation
Congress's inclusion of the PIA requirement engendered signifi-
cant optimism. PIAs, the Senate Report stated, "are increasingly being
recognized as an important means of ensuring that privacy protection
is being taken into account.' 26 Echoing that language, OMB Director
Josh Bolten declared that PIAs-in combination with other existing
requirements-would "ensure" that information "is handled in a
manner that maximizes both privacy and security.27 By both requiring
agencies to weigh privacy concerns along with their primary substan-
tive mandates and rendering their decision processes more transpar-
ent to outsiders, privacy advocates, in turn, believed PIAs would
"force" agencies to "act responsibly ... [and] ultimately lead to better-
designed and more user-oriented government IT projects."
' '
The reality is far less uniform. The self-reported agency data in
OMB's most recent report to Congress states that 12 percent of agen-
cies did not yet even have written processes or policies for all listed
aspects of PIAs, while 16 percent of systems that were admittedly cov-
ered by the PIA requirement did not have a complete or current
PIA. 9 Particular laggards include agencies as diverse as the EPA (no
compliant PIA for 50 percent of covered systems), the Office of Per-
sonnel Management (43 percent), the Department of Transportation
(17 percent), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (52 percent), as
well as the Departments of Defense (63 percent) and Homeland Se-
curity (76 percent). The incidence of noncompliance is likely even
more worrisome in light of potential definitional problems. While the
DOS reported that it had complete or current PIAs for 151 percent of
its covered systems,0 one half of the PIAs listed on their website are
not publicly posted, and no PIAs have been issued for particularly
privacy-sensitive programs such as PASS Card and other new border
initiatives. Moreover, more individualized analyses suggest that these
self-reported figures mask deeper qualitative noncompliance issues
26 S Rep No 107-74 at 28-29 (cited in note 5).
27 OMB, Guidance at 1 (cited in note 8).
28 Center for Democracy & Technology, Statement of the Center for Democracy & Technology
before the Senate Government Affairs Committee (July 11, 2001), online at http://www.cdt.org/testi-
mony/010711cdt.shtml (visited Jan 12, 2008) (arguing that the Privacy Act of 1974 had become
obsolete and that PIAs could help reassure users of online government services).
29 See OMB, FY 2006 Report to Congress on Implementation of the Federal Information
Security Management Act of 2002 7, online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/reports/
2006fisma-report.pdf (visited Jan 12, 2008). Such figures are likely skewed even on their own
terms, as they reflect the data from several agencies who, because of a difference in terminology,
reported compliance over 100 percent, for example, Department of Agriculture (127 percent),
DOS (151 percent), and Housing and Urban Development (254 percent). Id.
30 See id at 114-15.
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with the PIA mandate. GAO reports, for example, have documented:
(1) a number of specific failures to comply with privacy requirements
for programs covered by the E-Government Act's terms;3' (2) insuffi-
cient consideration of privacy concerns to satisfy the statute;32 and
(3) highly "uneven" compliance even with OMB's guidance on basic
Privacy Act requirements.33
II. BARRIERS TO ACCOUNTABILITY IN PRIVACY DECISIONS
The inconsistent implementation of privacy processes provides a
striking instance of the governance challenge created when Congress
delegates substantial implementation discretion to administrative
agencies. This challenge is heightened when the discretion delegated
relates to the implementation of a secondary, rather than primary, ob-
jective of the agency. Legal scholars and political scientists have em-
phasized the capacity of the three constitutional branches of govern-
ment to overcome the delegation problem and promote administra-
tive accountability. Yet to date, traditional mechanisms for cabining
delegated discretion have failed to yield consistent agency compliance
with the statutory PIA mandate.
A. Limits of Process
The record of agency inconsistency belies the contentions that
requiring a PIA process alone would "mandate" or "force" agency
consideration of privacy values in decisions about technology. Cer-
tainly, in some circumstances Congress can successfully overcome the
31 See GAO, Homeland Security: Continuing Attention to Privacy Concerns is Needed as
Programs Are Developed ("Homeland Security Report"), GAO-07-630T, 10-15 (Mar 2007),
online at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07630t.pdf (visited Jan 12.2008) (concluding that "DHS
did not assess privacy risks in developing a data mining tool known as ADVISE ... as required
by the E-Government Act of 2002," thcreby creating the "risk that uses of ADVISE in systems
containing personal information could require costly and potentially duplicative retrofitting at a
later date to add the needed controls"). See also id at 18-19 (noting DHS's failure even to com-
ply with Privacy Act notice for "Secure Flight," a program to evaluate passengers before they
board an aircraft on domestic flights).
32 See GAO, Data Mining: Agencies Have Taken Key Steps to Protect Privacy in Selected
Efforts, but Significant Compliance Issues Remain, GAO-05-866, 24-27 (Aug 2005), online at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05866.pdf (visited Jan 12, 2008) (noting that the IRS, Small Busi-
ness Administration, and Risk Management Agency PIAs did not adequately address the statu-
tory requirements regarding their data mining efforts and that the FBI conducted no PIA, in viola-
tion of agency regulations). See also GAO, Homeland Security Report at 17-18 (cited in note 31)
(reporting that privacy guidelines developed for implementing the Intelligence Reform and Terror-
ism Prevention Act of 2004 "provide only a high-level framework for privacy protection").
33 See GAO, Privacy Act: OMB Leadership Needed to Improve Agency Compliance, GAO-
03-304, 14 (June 2003), online at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03304.pdf (visited Jan 12, 2008)
(reporting compliance with requirements as low as 70 percent).
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principal-agent problems inherent in administrative delegation by, ex
ante, employing specific statutory directives and requiring certain de-
cision procedures." Yet experience to date indicates that the PIA
process requirement alone is insufficient to ensure the effective inte-
gration of privacy concerns."
Indeed, external process requirements-without additional ac-
countability or oversight structures-seem particularly unsuited to
robust and consistent integration of values, like privacy, that may be at
best orthogonal to, and at worst in tension with, an agency's primary
mission. Of course, such secondary process mandates are intended
explicitly to "mitigate agency tunnel vision or mission orientation" by
requiring that they consider goals that are not directly within their
charge." Yet as a result, such mandates face particular problems with
agency reluctance to comply. At a minimum, an agency's organic stat-
ute may embody a variety of goals-some that conflict directly with
privacy concerns-to which administrators may legitimately point to
in justifying their actions internally and externally.37 More significantly,
process directives alone may make little headway in redirecting
agency structures, cultures, and decisionmaking routines geared to
maximizing the agency's primary mission. 8
Experience with the statute on which the PIA process was
roughly modeled-the National Environmental Policy Act of 196939
(NEPA), which mandates the completion of environmental impact
statements (EISs) for federal government action significantly affecting
34 See Matthew D. McCubbins and Talbot Page, A Theory of Congressional Delegation, in
Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan, eds, Congress: Structure and Policy 409, 411-13 (Cam-
bridge 1987) (analyzing the tools Congress has at its disposal to control and channel agency
decisionmaking and to improve information available to decisionmakers).
35 See, for example, David B. Spence, Agency Discretion and the Dynamics of Procedural
Reform, 59 Pub Admin Rev 425,436 (1999) (concluding that the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission used its discretion to minimize the effects of a series of imposed procedural requirements).
36 Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Difference: A Preliminary Inquiry
into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 Admin L Rev 501,509 (2005) (arguing that agencies, like
courts, must fit statutory language into the overarching legal framework).
37 See J.R. DeShazo and Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 Colum L Rev
2217, 2219 (2005) (discussing the tension between primary and secondary mandates). See also id
at 2220 (citing examples of "[a]gencies frequently resolv[ing] [ I interstatutory conflicts by priori-
tizing their primary mission and letting their secondary obligations fall by the wayside"); Jeanne
Nienaber Clarke and Daniel C. McCool, Staking Out the Terrain: Power Differential among
Natural Resource Management Agencies 4-5 (SUNY 2d ed 1996) (noting that some agencies may
not easily incorporate the purposes of new legislation, even when they accord with the agency's
original mission).
38 See generally Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Deci-
sionmaking and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 Duke L J 377 (2006) (discussing
systemic barriers to incorporating secondary goals in organizational decisionmaking).
39 Pub L No 91-190,83 Stat 852, codified as amended at 42 USC §§ 4321-47 (2000).
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environmental quality -exemplifies these concerns."0 NEPA's initial
focus on decision processes alone permitted widespread resistance in
many agencies, resulting in widely inconsistent implementation,' and
was, accordingly, subject to strong early criticism."
NEPA is now, however, considered by many in and out of agen-
cies to have successfully "institutionaliz[ed] environmental values in
government." 3 Agency employees themselves attribute this transfor-
mation to the development of robust judicial and executive oversight
unanticipated by the initial legislation. The text of NEPA provided for
no oversight responsibility. Its drafters evidently assumed that the EIS
requirement would be self-implementing, and the statute simply di-
rected each agency to develop their own methods and procedures for
integrating environmental values into agency decisionmaking. The
year after the Act's passage, however, the oversight powers of the
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) were enhanced by execu-
tive order." The CEQ issued three sets of progressively more detailed
implementation guidelines and took on a strong coordination role,
working with agencies to direct consistent NEPA implementation." At
the same time, courts took an active role in review of the EIS process,
ordering agencies to implement NEPA's procedural reforms, adopting
broad constructions of many of the Act's provisions, and imposing
meaningful sanctions for noncompliance in the form of costly and
40 See 42 USC § 4332(2)(C) (requiring EISs to report the environmental impacts of the
proposed action, alternatives to the proposed action, and any adverse environmental impacts
which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented).
41 See Allan F. Wichelman, Administrative Agency Implementation of the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act of 1969: A Conceptual Framework for Explaining Differential Response, 16
Nat Res J 263, 296-300 (1976) (studying the implementation of NEPA across twenty different
federal agencies).
42 See, for example, Joseph L. Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth about NEPA, 26 Okla L Rev 239,
248 (1973) ("Until we are ready to face [ I hard realities, we can expect laws like NEPA to pro-
duce little except fodder for law review writers and contracts for that newest of growth indus-
tries, environmental consulting.").
43 Serge Taylor, Making Bureaucracies Think: The Environmental Impact Statement Strat-
egy of Administrative Reform 251 (Stanford 1984) ("Since the advent of NEPA, environmental
concerns have been officially incorporated into every agency's charter."). See also Council on
Environmental Quality, The National Environmental Policy Act: A Study of Its Effectiveness after
Twenty-Five Years iii (Jan 1997), online at http://ceq.eh.doe.gov/nepa/nepa25fn.pdf (visited Jan
12,2008) (discussing NEPA's "success" in making federal agencies take a "hard look" at the poten-
tial environmental consequences of their actions). But see Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a
Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government's Environmental Performance, 102 Colum L
Rev 903,904-06 (2002) (describing the positions of both proponents and critics of NEPA).
44 See Executive Order 11514,35 Fed Reg 4247 (1970).
45 See Wichelman, 16 Nat Res J at 275-76 (cited in note 41) (discussing the CEQ's role as
an overseer that provided "the coordination necessary to assure implementation of specific court
decisions across the administrative process" and that became a focus to which agencies could
turn voluntarily for informal guidance).
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time-consuming injunctions and adverse publicity."6 The resulting
transparency, in turn, permitted public oversight by providing envi-
ronmental advocates a window into agency decisionmaking. This
combination of external oversight of the EIS requirement is credited
for catalyzing a "wide range of internal agency adaptations," resulting
in the integration of environmental concerns in agency decisions.7
B. Barriers to Oversight
In general, the president and Congress have important adminis-
trative oversight tools at their disposal. Advocates of presidential con-
trol of administration document the chief executive's capacity as pri-
mary administrative overseer, citing his ability to overcome the in-
terest group influence to which Congress and agencies are vulnerable '9
and to rationalize policy across agencies, encouraging the consistent
administrative implementation of legal mandates."0 Congress pos-
sesses, through its committee structure and budget oversight, the ca-
pacity to engage in either ongoing oversight of agency implementation
of statutes-what political scientists call "police patrols"'" -or more
intermittent action prompted by the "fire alarms" sounded by "tar-
geted beneficiaries as a mechanism to trigger formal investigations
46 Scholars point to judicial review as a particularly important element in NEPA's success.
See, for example, Nicolas C. Yost and James W. Rubin, Administrative Implementation of and
Judicial Review under the National Environmental Policy Act, in Sheldon M. Novick, Donald W.
Stever, and Margaret G. Mellon, eds, 2 The Law of Environmental Protection ch 10:1 (West 2007).
See also Kleppe v Sierra Club, 427 US 390, 421 (1975) (Marshall concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) ("[Tlhis vaguely worded statute seems designed to serve as no more than a catalyst
for development of a 'common law' of NEPA. To date, the courts have responded in just that
manner and have created such a 'common law.' ... Indeed, that development is the source of
NEPA's success.").
47 See Wichelman, 16 Nat Res J at 278 (cited in note 41) (describing initial resistance and
eventual capitulation by agencies to EIS requirements).
48 See, for example, Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv L Rev 2246,2246-339
(2001) (arguing that presidents can press administrative agencies to act in ways they have not be-
fore, to address problems not previously seen, and to devise solutions not formerly contem-
plated); Cynthia R. Farina, The "Chief Executive" and the Quiet Constitutional Revolution, 49
Admin L Rev 179, 180-84 (1997) (discussing the evolution of constitutional law to permit exten-
sive control of agencies by the chief executive and its impact on the "regulatory enterprise").
49 See, for example, William R West, Presidential Influence and the Coordination of Bu-
reaucratic Policy: An Examination of the Doctrine of Executive Centralization 23 (Bush School
Working Paper No 520), online at http:/bush.tamu.edu/research/workingpapers/wwest/TheThe-
oryofPresidentialManagement.pdf (visited Jan 12,2008) (noting the increasing need for presidential
mechanisms that reconcile differences among bureaucratic organizations due to the proliferation of
interest groups).
50 See, for example, Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk
Regulation 71-72 (Harvard 1993) (discussing centralization by structuring agencies and using
OMB review).
51 See Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 Am J Polit Sci 165, 166 (1984).
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and/or legislative responses to noncompliance." 2 In addition to political
controls on bureaucracy, judicial review can, as in the case of NEPA,
provide a powerful independent check on administrative discretion.
We suggest, however, that several factors specific to the PIA con-
text create obstacles to traditional forms of direct oversight by the
political branches and the courts and hinder the public monitoring that
can facilitate each: the contemporary politics of privacy, a lack of deci-
sion openness, and the opacity of decisions about technology. 3 Any pol-
icy prescription for privacy protection must contend with each.
1. Politics, secrecy, and technical impenetrability.
Expending political capital on privacy can be risky. While polls
consistently reveal deep concern about information abuse and support
for privacy protections in general," particular policy decisions fre-
quently counterpose privacy against two other powerfui values: effi-
ciency and security. The ideological and political pressures supporting
each run deep. Technology is adopted, in large part, as a seemingly
value-neutral means for promoting efficient and effective pursuit of
public goals whose legitimacy has already been settled in the political
arena. Seeking to overcome the resulting presumption in technology's
favor with privacy claims exposes the bearer to political risk. Placing
privacy in conflict with security raises even greater political hazard,
because of the immense risk of even a low-probability security event.
The experience of former Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick,
blamed for the set of directives creating a "wall" prohibiting FBI and
CIA coordination in light of civil liberties concerns-an act former
Attorney General John Ashcroft called "the single greatest structural
cause for September 11"" -stands as a salient cautionary tale. As one
52 Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process,
Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 Va L
Rev 431,434 (1989).
53 See generally Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U Pa L
Rev 707 (1987) (discussing reasons why individual rights of action through the courts and execu-
tive and legislative oversight are insufficient to effect privacy protection with government, point-
ing to particular problems with access, technical knowledge, and intensity of supervision).
54 See, for example, Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), Public Opinion on
Privacy, online at http://www.epic.org/privacy/survey (visited Jan 12, 2008) (summarizing various
public opinion polls on the importance of privacy and concluding that there is "strong support
among Americans for privacy rights in law to protect their personal information from govern-
ment and commercial entities").
55 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Tenth Public Hear-
ing: Law Enforcement and the Intelligence Committee (Apr 13, 2004) (testimony of Attorney
General John Ashcroft), online at http://www.9-1lcommission.gov/hearings/hearinglO/ashcroft
statement.pdf (visited Jan 12,2008).
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news network reminded us, "no one wants to be the one who dropped
the ball when, as predicted, terrorists strike again." 6
These political disincentives are exacerbated by practical obsta-
cles to robust oversight arising from limits on openness and transpar-
ency in the privacy assessment process.
The first obstacle inheres in the implementation of the E-Gov-
ernment Act itself. Despite the statute's explicit commitment to the
production of PIAs before developing or purchasing IT systems, and
the publication of those PIAs, it lacks any public consultation process
for their production. Indeed, a federal court has rejected the single
Freedom of Information Act57 (FOIA) request by a privacy advocacy
group for draft PIAs developed in advance of a proposed rulemaking
on the very ground that those documents were "predecisional" and
therefore fell within one of the established FOIA exemptions." The
politically charged nature of decisions balancing surveillance capacity
with privacy safeguards further strengthens the incentives to take ad-
vantage of this shield. And while the safeguards afforded by the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act 9 (APA) at least permit some form of pub-
lic participation in formal agency action effected by means of notice
and comment rulemaking (albeit after the initial assessments have
already been completed), the development or procurement of infor-
mation systems is often treated as a management issue and accom-
plished through more informal means; in those contexts, if the PIA is
not made available to the public prior to development or procure-
ment, there is no vehicle for public participation before technology
has been purchased and implemented.
The lack of explicit mechanisms for public participation in the
PIA process-a process that, under the statute, should occur at the
early stage of development-limits the opportunities for outside ex-
perts to assist the agency in identifying the privacy implications of of-
ten complex technological systems. Absent external direction or inter-
nal efforts to engage the public through a comment process or other
means, public input is limited to the stage in which proposals and pro-
grams are well developed. Relegated to this late stage, the public com-
56 Thalia Assuras and Joie Chen, House and Senate Committees Will Begin Rare August
Hearings, CBS News Transcripts (July 24, 2004) (discussing increased attention to intelligence
reform following the release of the 9/11 Commission Report).
57 Pub L No 89-554, 80 Stat 383 (1966), codified as amended at 5 USC § 552 (2000 & Supp
2002).
58 See EPIC v TSA, 2006 WL 626925, *10 (DDC 2006) (rejecting a FO1A request by EPIC
to obtain PIA associated with the development by the TSA of the Computer Assisted Passenger
Prescreening System (CAPPS II)).
59 Pub L No 89-554,80 Stat 381 (1966), codified as amended at 5 USC " 551 et seq (2000 &
Supp 2004).
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ments are more likely to result in revisions on the margins rather than
fundamental switches in technology or architectural design.
A second constellation of transparency concerns arises from the
technical nature of the information systems whose adoption the PIA
process was designed to influence. In general, the problem of bureau-
cratic discretion increases along with information asymmetries be-
tween expert agencies and their overseers." These asymmetries can be
particularly pronounced because the debates that raise privacy con-
cerns frequently involve technical standards that can be both proce-
durally and linguistically inaccessible.6' Technology is often positioned
as neutral with respect to values when, in fact, it can create and im-
plement value decisions at least as effectively as more traditional
forms of regulation.62 Decisions about the design and deployment of
technical systems, then, can permit bureaucrats to cloak policy deci-
sions and mask the exercise of discretion behind claims of technical
neutrality.3 The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the privacy
concerns created by information systems are frequently analyzed in
the abstract and may depend upon testing an agency's specific-and
often idiosyncratic-technological implementation. Unlike the type of
expert information on which administrative policy more traditionally
relies-the safe level of atmospheric chemical discharge, for exam-
ple-privacy effects of system design have only recently become the
60 See Arthur Lupia and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Democratic Dilemma 79, 215-16
(Cambridge 1998) (highlighting the lack of common interest and information discrepancies
between agents and principles).
61 See Paul Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration: The Failure of the
American Legal Response to the Computer, 43 Hastings L J 1321, 1380-81 (1992) (discussing the
difficulty of congressional oversight in light of the growth in data processing as the source of
privacy issues).
62 See Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace 107-08, 120-21 (Basic Books
1999) (noting the importance of structure in determining the ability of agencies to regulate and
the danger that courts will back away from new and technical regulatory issues); Langdon Win-
ner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, in Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman, eds, The Social Shap-
ing of Technology 28-40 (Open 2d ed 1999) (discussing technology's impact on the structure of
power and authority and its often inherently political nature); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Infor-
matica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules through Technology, 76 Tex L Rev 553,553-54
(1998) (arguing that technological capabilities and system design choices can impose rules on
network participants, adding to or supplanting traditional forms of regulation); Helen Nis-
senbaum, Values in the Design of Computer Systems, 1998 Computers Socy 38, 38-39 (arguing
that values, including public policy values, are embedded in design choices and asking who
should control the undemocratic values embedded in designs).
63 See Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics? at 31 (cited in note 62) (providing examples of
political decisions cloaked as seemingly neutral aesthetic choices about architecture and city
planning). As an example, systems of identification can be designed with a higher or lower pro-
pensity for false positives and false negatives. Depending upon the context of use, a decision to
prefer errors in one direction or the other has profound policy consequences, for example, purg-
ing eligible voters from the rolls.
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subject of regular public scientific analysis and often depend upon
system-specific implementation details unknown to the public. 6
Access to this information, however, is frequently obscured. The
PIA and other public documentation of DOS's e-Passport program
discussed below, for example, did not provide the exact specifications
of the system under consideration, referring to a list of documents
outlining both optional and mandatory requirements of standards
developed by the International Civil Aviation Organization, a private
standard-setting body. Nor did either agency proactively engage in
scientific studies to identify systematically the privacy and security
consequences of the technology or specific implementation options.
Understanding the specifics of the technology DOS was seeking to
employ-which is a prerequisite for meaningful participation in the
notice and comment process accompanying its roll out-would have
required a detailed analysis of the e-Passport proposal, access to and
analysis of an enormous amount of free-standing technical documen-
tation and specifications,6 and, ideally, the ability to test the technol-
ogy independently.
2. Anemic oversight.
Reflecting these obstacles, oversight of PIA agency implementa-
tion has been weak. The E-Government Act and guidance implemen-
tation appear to anticipate a central role for executive branch over-
sight by incorporating PIAs into OMB review, a principal means by
which the White House has exercised political control over agency
discretion and become much more directly involved in administrative
action in recent decades.6' Indeed, President Clinton's chief counselor
64 This might be a context in which adherence to the standards of the Data Quality Act,
Pub L No 106-554, 114 Stat 2763 (2000), codified at 44 § USC 3516 note (2000), could possibly be
helpful, as it could force agencies to provide research support for privacy and security claims.
Such a requirement could, of course, cut in the opposite direction.
65 See Marci Meingast, Jennifer King, and Deirdre K. Mulligan, Embedded RFID and
Everyday Things: A Case Study of the Security and Privacy Risks of the U.S. e-Passport, Proceed-
ings of IEEE International Conference on RFID 4-5 (2007), online at http://www.truststc.org/
pubs/157/MeingastKingMulliganRFID2007_Final.pdf (visited Jan 12, 2008) (discussing the
e-Passport project's failure to address security and privacy risks to passport holders, in part
because of insufficient information).
66 It has done so by means of "regulatory review." See Executive Order 12866, 58 Fed Reg
51735 (1993) (establishing the guiding principles agencies must follow when developing regula-
tions). See also GAO, Rulemaking: OMB's Role in Reviews of Agencies' Draft Rules and the
Transparency of Those Reviews, GAO-03-929, 110 (Sept 2003), online at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d03929.pdf (visited Jan 12, 2008) (concluding that while Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs reviews clearly have an analytical component, they also are a way to ensure
that agencies' regulatory programs are consistent with administration priorities); Steven Croley,
White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U Chi L Rev 821,
846-49 (2003) (examining nearly twenty years of OMB review of agency rulemaking).
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for privacy at OMB, Peter Swire, a political appointee who enjoyed
close relations to the White House and participated in a wide range of
policymaking activity," considers the OMB review process a critical
intervention point for establishing cross-agency privacy policy.8 Ex-
ecutive oversight, however, has not emerged as a means for ensuring
that agencies consider privacy in the Bush presidency-a presidency
strongly aligned with security rhetoric above all else-highlighting
political accountability's contingency on a particular administration's
commitment to the operative statutory goal. After taking office, Presi-
dent Bush did not preserve the chief privacy counsel position in OMB
despite calls for a renewal of the position by advocacy groups.6' To
date, privacy issues at OMB have been delegated to a policy analyst
who lacks the ability to intervene at a policy level and has limited au-
thority to challenge agency noncompliance with privacy mandates
absent substantial support from higher agency personnel. OMB fur-
ther signaled a low level of commitment to privacy oversight by failing
to provide the PIA guidance mandated by Congress until seven
months after the statute's operative date,"0 subsequently encouraging
agencies to make PIAs available only after agency budgets are final-
ized, and undermining the intended use of PIAs as a predecisional
privacy input and a potential, if weak, vehicle for public feedback. The
decision not to place privacy under the purview of a high-level official
is particularly detrimental in the context of OMB, which, hindered by
resource constraints and competing priorities, is often ineffective at
proactive coordination of consistent action across executive agencies
in any circumstance." The result has been, in the words of the GAO, a
67 His work has spanned encryption policy, the creation of privacy policies on federal
government web sites, and medical records privacy. See Peter P. Swire, The Administration Re-
sponse to the Challenges of Protecting Privacy 14, 17 (unpublished manuscript, presented at the
Stanford Law Review Symposium on Privacy, Jan 8, 2000), online at http://www.peterswire.net/
stanford7.doc (visited Jan 12,2008).
68 See id at 22.
69 See Center for Democracy & Technology, Press Release, Public Interest Groups and
Academics Call on Bush Administration to Fill Privacy Position (Apr 16, 2001), online at http://
www.cdt.org/press/010416press.shtml (visited Jan 12, 2008) (reporting on concern from privacy
advocacy groups over the vacant position).
70 Agencies were to begin producing PIAs in April 2003, 120 days after enactment, but
OMB did not issue its guidance until September of that year. See generally OMB, Guidance
(cited in note 8).
71 See William F. West, Presidential Leadership and Administrative Coordination: Examin-
ing the Theory of a Unified Executive, 36 Pres Stud Q 433,445-46 (2006) (noting that OMB does
not engage in proactive oversight intended to reduce conflicts among regulations or to ensure
consistent application of the regulatory analysis process); Lisa Schultz Bressman and Michael P.
Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential
Control, 105 Mich L Rev 47, 50 (2006) (arguing that review does not successfully avoid inconsis-
tencies among the regulations of a particular agency).
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"lack of sufficient OMB leadership [and] guidance" on privacy com-
pliance generally.2
These barriers to PIA oversight also amplify disincentives for leg-
islative action. The attendant political risks and the strength of interest
groups typically aligned against privacy legislation enhance the diffi-
culty and cost of sustaining a coalition committed to active congres-
sional monitoring of statutory implementation after passage." The
practical challenge of monitoring privacy and technology choices-
especially after the elimination of Congress's Office of Technology
Assessment in 1995'-under a system in which particular committees
and subcommittees frequently oversee only one or a few agencies,
may make active congressional policing a particularly inefficient
means for oversight of a cross-agency mandate. The opacity of admin-
istrative privacy and technology decisionmaking diminishes the pub-
lic's access to information necessary to raise the alarm for congressional
action. Not surprisingly, while GAO- Congress's oversight arm- has
issued a number of reports criticizing privacy decisions ex post, Con-
gress itself has not engaged, on the whole, actively in monitoring."
72 GAO, Privacy Act at 40 (cited in note 33).
73 See Priscilla M. Regan, Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Value, and Public Policy
207-09 (UNC 1995).
74 See Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), OTA Archive (Aug 1996), online at
http://www.gpo.gov/ota (visited Jan 12, 2008):
For 23 years, the nonpartisan analytical agency assisted Congress with the complex and
highly technical issues that increasingly affect our society.... The 104th Congress voted to
withdraw funding for OTA and its full-time staff of 143 persons, and cover only a skeleton
staff and the amount needed for the agency's final closeout.
75 An October 2007 Lexis search of the "Congressional Record" database over the past ten
years for "privacy impact assessment" yields forty-nine hits; there are no colloquies or discussion
of PIAs on the floor, and most of these hits are mentions in passing, or texts of bills and amend-
ments. Only two hearings have even included any sustained discussion of PIAs, both in colloquy
with DHS privacy officers. See Protection of Privacy in the DHS Intelligence Enterprise, Hear-
ings before the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assess-
ment of the House Homeland Security Committee, 109th Cong, 2d Sess (2006) (testimony of
Maureen Cooney, Acting Chief Privacy Officer, Department of Homeland Security) (describing
how "the Privacy Office has worked to build privacy into the sinews of" DHS); Privacy in the
Hands of the Government: The Privacy Officer for the Department of Homeland Security, Hear-
ings before the Subcommittee of Commercial and Administrative Law of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, 108th Cong, 2d Sess (2004) (discussing the unavailability of PLAs for meaningful
notice and comment). However, Senator Lieberman, author of the E-Government Act of 2002,
and his staff have engaged in some oversight activities, the majority of which occurred at the staff
level and off the public record. Some of the Senator's work in this area is evident in press re-
leases. See, for example, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
Press Release, DHS Violates Privacy Impact Requirements with US Visit Technology (Dec 4,2003),
online at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.DetaiI&PressReease-
id=599&Affiliation=C (visited Jan 12, 2008) (reporting Senator Lieberman's correspondence
with then-DHS Secretary Tom Ridge and raising DHS's failure to conduct and make public
privacy impact assessments for biometric technology); Senate Committee on Homeland Security
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Finally, not a single court challenge has been brought against a
PIA to date. There is certainly a possibility that effective judicial over-
sight may germinate in a contingent and unexpected manner as it did
with NEPA. Yet, scholars underscore, as well, the ways in which simi-
lar problems of access, technical knowledge, and required intensity of
supervision undermine individual rights of action.76 Moreover, it may
well be that the E-Government Act and guidance as written simply
will not provide the traction for review found in the far more detailed
iterations of the NEPA rules.
III. SEEKING ELEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE SUCCESS:
THE CASE OF RFID
The inconsistency of PIA implementation is epitomized by the
cases of two different agencies-DOS in the case of the e-Passport pro-
gram and DHS with respect to its US-VISIT initiative-considering the
adoption of RFID technology in travel documents. This Part explores
some of the elements salient to the DHS US-VISIT process, including
agency structure and personnel that might explain that process's rela-
tive success in contrast to DOS's comparable inquiry. Together with the
preceding discussion of oversight obstacles, these case-specific compli-
ance experiences can suggest factors to overcome and elements to re-
produce in the future institutionalization of privacy policy.
A. The Cases in Brief
1. The e-Passport program.
In February 2005, DOS published a proposed rulemaking setting
forth a program for an e-Passport, an enhanced version of the tradi-
tional passport featuring an embedded electronic chip containing the
information from the data page of the passport and a digital copy of
the bearer's photo. The chip, a radio frequency (RF) transponder, is
readable without physical contact through wireless technology. The
agency concluded the previous year that the e-Passport would provide
"significant security benefits" in that it was more tamper-resistant and
and Governmental Affairs, Press Release, Government Privacy Protections Fall Short, Lieberman
Calls for Leadership, Greater Commitment of Resources (July 30, 2003), online at http:/!
www.hsgac.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease-id=333&Affi
liation=C (visited Jan 12, 2008) (reporting Senator Lieberman's criticism of the GAO for failing
to protect privacy rights and his call to the Bush Administration to show a greater commitment
to privacy policy).
76 See, for example, Simitis, 135 U Pa L Rev at 746 (cited in note 53) ("For a democratic
society [ 1 the risks [of processing personal datal are high: labeling of individuals, manipulative
tendencies, magnification of errors, and strengthening of social control threaten the very fabric of
democracy.").
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harder to forge than traditional passports." Yet the proposed rule-a
product of a two-year process-and the summary PIA made public
after it had been promulgated failed to address privacy (and security)
risks to the bearer whose personal information the RFID chips con-
tained.78 Indeed, the two-page PIA omits most of the critical elements
specified in the OMB guidance; notably, it does not mention RFID
technology, it neither identifies nor addresses any potential privacy
risks it might create, and it provides no information about the range of
testing, let alone the data that informed DOS's technical decisions.7 9
The proposed rule itself, without considering the effect of technology
on data access and collection, summarily rejected data protection con-
cerns, concluding that the e-Passport did not merit encryption because
"the personal data stored on the passport's electronic chip consists
simply of the information traditionally and visibly displayed on the
passport data page."'
This silence on risks is particularly striking in light of the threat
inherent in RFID technology. Indeed, documents later received pur-
suant to a FOIA request document internal DOS discussions about
concerns over "skimming"-unauthorized wireless access of the data
on the transponder without the owner's knowledge or consent-as
early as January 2003, yet tests to examine the e-Passport's vulnerabil-
ity were not requisitioned until February 2005, several months after
the PIA was completed.8' The results of those tests, performed by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology, have still not been
released to the public at the time of publication." While skimming in
and of itself poses privacy problems inherent in the access to person-
ally identifiable data and photographs, the fact that the vulnerable
77 See DOS, Abstract of Concept of Operations for the Integration of Contactless Chip in the
US. Passport 3,28 (2004), online at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/jul/us-biometric-passport-
original.pdf (visited Jan 12,2008).
78 Meingast, King, and Mulligan, Embedded RFID and Everyday Things at 4 (cited in note
65). See generally DOS, 2006 Summary Privacy Impact Assessment (2004), online at http://
foia.state.gov/spias/20061.dos~pia.summary.passport-cleared.pdf (visited Jan 12,2008).
79 Compare DOS, 2006 Summary Privacy Impact Assessment (cited in note 78), with OMB,
Guidance (cited in note 8) (setting out PIA content requirements). The Center for Democracy &
Technology has sought, as has the Samuelson Law, Technology & Public Policy Clinic and the
ACLU, access to PIAs conducted in relation to the e-Passport project. At this point we believe it
is quite possible that a full PIA was not conducted, and if it was, it seems highly likely that it
occurred after the development of the system rather than before as directed by the law. See
Letter from Center for Democracy & Technology to Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, 1-2
(May 2,2007), online at http://www.cdt.org/security/identity/20070502rice.pdf (visited Jan 12,2008).
80 DOS, Electronic Passport, 70 Fed Reg 8305,8306 (2005) (proposed rule).
81 See Meingast, King, and Mulligan, Embedded RFID and Everyday Things at 2 (cited in
note 65).
82 They have also not been released to one of the authors under a still-pending FOIA
request.
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data is frequently attached to a physical person (the carrier) magnifies
the security threat. Passport bearers can be tracked, identified, and
subject to violence triggered remotely by as little information as their
US nationality. While some of the privacy concerns were ultimately
addressed in a revised final rule (specifically the incorporation of an
antiskimming material in the cover of the passport, a locking code
limiting data access to authorized readers, and transmission encryp-
tion), the ultimate rollout of the program was delayed a year. More-
over, the question of whether RFID was the appropriate technology,
balancing the costs and effectiveness of privacy protection add-ons,
was never addressed in the first instance.
2. The US-VISIT program.
DHS chose similar RF technology when piloting the US-VISIT
program pursuant to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Preven-
tion Act of 2004.3 That statute required DHS to collect biometric exit
data from all individuals who are also required to provide such data
when they enter the United States, and DHS proposed the use of pas-
sive RFID tags embedded in the 1-94 arrival/departure form to track
entry and exit of foreign visitors at land border point of entry cross-
ings. The embedded tag would store no personally identifiable data,
but would instead contain a unique identifier linked to a traveler's
information in the US-VISIT database.-
The two PIAs DHS conducted for the US-VISIT project are
eight and thirty-three pages long respectively." They contain relatively
detailed information about the system architecture, data flows, and
access controls, and lay out the privacy threats and mitigation tech-
niques in clear charts. While the PIA process was not entirely without
criticism of its timing and substantive conclusions,6 it was generally
lauded as "a high-quality PIA" that can "serve as a model for upcom-
ing PIAs of other national security-related systems." , To further ad-
83 Pub L No 108-458, 118 Stat 3638.
84 See DHS, Privacy Act of 1974; Systems of Records 2 (July 1, 2005), online at http://
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacysorn_usvisit-aidms.pdf (visited Jan 12,2008).
85 See generally DHS, Privacy Impact Assessment and Privacy Policy; US-VISIT Program,
69 Fed Reg 2608 (2004); DHS, US-VISIT Program, Increment 2 Privacy Impact Assessment in
Conjunction with the Interim Final Rule of August 31, 2004 (2004), online at http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy-pia usvisit.pdf (visited Jan 12,2008).
86 See Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Government
Privacy Protections Fall Short (cited in note 75) ("In order for the privacy impact assessment to
serve its intended purpose, the PIA must be conducted before the agency develops or procures
information technology for the program.").
87 Letter from Center for Democracy & Technology to DHS Privacy Office 4 (Feb 4,2004),
online at http://cdt.org/security/usvisit/20040204cdt.pdf (visited Jan 12,2008).
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vance public participation in the PIA process, the DHS chief privacy
officer (CPO) held meetings with privacy and immigration organiza-
tions to further explore privacy concerns. Issues identified through
these meetings, and by experts' comments on the PIA, were reflected
in subsequent PIAs and in the ultimate design of the project.-
B. Possible Explanations
A rich literature on decisionmaking in organizations documents
the difficulty inherent in attempts to force groups to include new pri-
orities-especially those imposed from the outside-in their program
goals. 9 Organizations are largely structured to foster the pursuit of
preexisting interests, which in the case of agencies is their primary
statutory mandate. Those interests are reflected in the relative power
and status accorded different individuals and groups; the way substan-
tive tasks are allocated to different units; the expertise, background,
and priorities of the organization's members; and the existing rules-
formal and informal-governing decisionmaking. Each of these ele-
ments creates systemic resistance to changes in priorities.
Delving further into the differential experience of the DOS and
DHS privacy processes surrounding RFID adoption, this Part draws
tentative lessons as to the elements that may overcome obstacles to
the incorporation of privacy concerns into agency decisionmaking.
Faced with an identical mandate and executive guidance on PIAs and
similarly freed from vigorous oversight, what might explain the differ-
ences in agency behavior, and more specifically DHS's engagement in
practices that met, and in many respects exceeded, compliance?
The RFID case studies suggest three areas of significant variance
between the agencies-each consistent with the broader literature
concerning internal and external forces on compliance within the pub-
88 See Privacy in the Hands of the Government: The Privacy Officer for the Department of
Homeland Security, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 108th Cong, 2d Sess (2004) (testimony of James X.
Dempsey, Executive Director, Center for Democracy & Technology) ("Dempsey Testimony")
(reporting that advocates expressed their concerns about issues such as the lack of information
on redress issues for visitors who believe that information held about them may be incorrect or
incorrectly interpreted and the unclear nature of the data quality and data retention rules).
89 See, for example, DeShazo and Freeman, 105 Colum L Rev at 2220-21 (cited in note 37)
(exploring the problem of agency reluctance in the face of multiple mandates and explaining
how and why agencies might resist secondary mandates, "which typically-though not always-
come in the form of obligations imposed in separate statutes passed after Congress delegates the
agency's primary mission in its enabling law"); Clarke and McCool, Staking Out the Terrain at 45
(cited in note 37) (explaining that agencies may not easily integrate functions and purposes of
new legislation even when they accord with agencies' original missions). See also Taylor, Making
Bureaucracies Think at 93-169 (cited in note 43) (providing case studies of how NEPA was
implemented and resisted by the Forest Service and the Army Corps of Engineers).
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lic and private sector-that we identify as potentially contributing to
the disparate levels of compliance with the PIA mandate: (1) the
status and independence of a privacy expert embedded within the
agency; (2) the decentralized distribution, disciplinary diversity, prior
experience, and expertise of the privacy staff; and (3) the creation of
an alternative external oversight structure, which proved particularly
significant given the lack of systematic congressional and administra-
tive privacy oversight.
1. Status and independence of embedded privacy experts.
The most visible difference between the two agencies at the time
of the RFID PIA processes was the existence of a high-status privacy
expert within DHS, the agency CPO, specifically charged with advanc-
ing privacy among competing agency interests, located in a central
position within the agency decisionmaking structure, drawing on in-
ternal relationships and external sources of power, and able to operate
with relative independence. The existence of such an embedded expert
was not fully predetermined by statute or agency culture, but resulted
instead from the confluence of structural, personal, and contextual
contingent factors. Nonetheless, the status and independence proved
determinative in the compliance-and "beyond compliance"-choices
surrounding the US-VISIT program.
The statute that established DHS provided the basic predicate for
these developments. The Homeland Security Act of 200290 ("DHS
Act"), which consolidated numerous previously independent intelli-
gence, regulatory, and enforcement functions under the cabinet-level
DHS, specifically established a privacy officer within the agency, the
first statutory privacy officer position at the federal level in the United
States.' The legislation directed the secretary of homeland security to
appoint a senior official with broad responsibility for ensuring that the
use of technologies sustain, and do not erode, privacy protections; en-
suring compliance with the Privacy Act of 1974; evaluating legislative
and regulatory proposals involving personal information; and con-
ducting privacy impact assessments.9
In response to his statutory mandate, Secretary Tom Ridge ap-
pointed Nuala O'Connor Kelly, then-CPO of the Department of
Commerce, as CPO at DHS. Kelly was a respected professional in the
privacy community, having served previously at the technology com-
pany DoubleClick, and one of the founding members of the Interna-
90 Pub L No 107-296, 116 Stat 2135.
91 See 6 USCA § 142 (2007).
92 See id.
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tional Association of Privacy Professionals, an industry group that
promulgates best practices, provides privacy professional certifications,
and advocates on privacy issues among public and private bodies. Kelly
enjoyed a high level of visibility and support from Secretary Ridge, re-
ported directly to him, and was part of his senior leadership team.
These developments occurred against a backdrop of organiza-
tional fluidity. While individual preexisting agencies and offices in-
cluded within the new DHS umbrella may have brought with them
strong cultures, practices, and priorities, the new DHS CPO office and
its first occupant developed alongside the new routines, cultural pre-
sumptions, and working relationships negotiated more broadly within
the newly organized DHS and its leadership. Because of a combina-
tion of internal agency structure mandated by external statutory man-
date, Kelly's experience as a respected professional in the privacy
community, and her legitimacy as a result of Secretary Ridge's com-
mitment to privacy issues generally and to his appointee in particular,
DHS had a privacy oversight function characterized by legitimacy and
strength from its inception.
Kelly, moreover, used the relative autonomy provided by the
status of her appointment, as well as the trust invested in her by Secre-
tary Ridge, to reframe DHS's agency mission to include the privacy
goals embodied by her office. Relying on arguably ambiguous lan-
guage in the DHS Act discussing annual CPO reporting to Congress93
and on thin legislative history," Kelly, with Secretary Ridge's support,
put forth a forward-leaning interpretation of her office's independ-
ence. She took a number of steps to institutionalize her office's auton-
omy and independence from both the secretary and other executive
branch controls, particularly the OMB clearance process. In particular,
Kelly framed her office's direct-congressional-reporting function as
both a right and an obligation, and emphasized the function's impor-
93 The statute directs the privacy officer to assume primary responsibility for privacy pol-
icy, including "preparing a report to Congress on an annual basis on activities of the Department
that affect privacy, including complaints of privacy violations, implementation of the Privacy Act
of 1974, internal controls, and other matters." 6 USCA § 142(a)(6). In other instances, however,
Congress has more clearly created direct reporting obligations. For example, in creating the
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, Congress explicitly created an independent report-
ing requirement stating, "the Board shall prepare a report to Congress." Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 § 1061(c)(4), 118 Stat at 3684, codified at 5 USC § 601 note
(2000 & Supp 2004).
94 See Administrative Law, Adjudicatory Issues, and Privacy Ramifications of Creating the
Department of Homeland Security, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Commercial and
Administrative Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong, 2d Sess 2-6 (2002)
(testimony of Peter P. Swire, Professor of Law, Ohio State University) (criticizing the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 as "all accelerator and no brakes" and as imposing extra layers of bureauc-
racy that will impede information gathering).
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tance as a signal of structural independence. She took the position that
reports from her office should not be reviewed by the DHS secretary
nor go through the standard OMB policy review process, and during
her tenure Kelly successfully prevented DHS or the White House
from exercising editorial control over reports issued by her office or
privacy impact assessments, although her annual report did go through
a review." Through this interpretation, moreover, she sought opportu-
nities to speak directly to potential oversight bodies-construed
broadly to include Congress, the press, and the public-even when her
communications and reports showed the agency failing in its obliga-
tion to protect privacy. In particular, the ability to point to external
pressures, and use an external reporting mechanism both as a threat
and a means for inviting external oversight, provided particularly ef-
fective means for enhancing legitimacy within the organization,9 tools
that would be used to great effect during the period of the US-VISIT
privacy process. Finally, Kelly leveraged her status and independence
so as to play a singular role in the creation of the Data Privacy and
Integrity Advisory Committee (DPIAC), an external oversight body
discussed below, which played an important role in the depth of the
US-VISIT PIA process.
None of the individuals who can be said to be responsible for
spearheading privacy policy at the DOS had the status or the inde-
pendence of Kelly. The senior DOS official designated as responsible
for privacy matters is not a dedicated CPO, but the assistant secretary
for administration- a high-level position, no doubt, but one differ-
ently situated with respect to overseeing and operationalizing the pri-
vacy mandate at DOS. Indeed, the position was held by William A.
Eaton, a career foreign service officer, from July 2001 through May
2005, when he was confirmed as US Ambassador to Panama, after
which the post was vacant for over a year. Formal privacy compliance
activities are managed and overseen by civil servants, some of whom
have substantial and impressive experience with privacy," but none of
whom possess comparable status or authority to the DHS CPO.9
95 Telephone interview with Nuala O'Connor Kelly, former DHS CPO ("Kelly Interview")
(June 1, 2007).
96 See Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald Salancik, The External Control of Organizations: A Re-
source Dependence Perspective 72-78 (Harper and Row 1978) (describing the interplay between
an organization's external "environments" and the way it focuses attention internally).
97 See DOS, Assistant Secretaries of State for Administration, online at http://www.state.gov/
r/pa/ho/po/12108.htm (visited Jan 12,2008).
98 See Dempsey Testimony (cited in note 88).
99 See Swire, The Administration Response at 22 (cited in note 67) (concluding, based on
his experience as the first Chief Counselor for Privacy that "privacy debates have a significant
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Because of these structures, neither high-level officials for whom
privacy tasks are grafted on to existing responsibilities nor civil service
privacy compliance officers are likely to possess means to achieve a
comparable level of independence as did the DHS CPO. The former
are senior officers "designated" as responsible for privacy pursuant to
the framework established in the Clinton Administration and codified
by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005; ' the very language
signals the subordinate status of the privacy function.
The "designated" privacy officer structure, in contrast to that de-
veloped at DHS, further undermines privacy officers' ability to draw
legitimacy from external pressures. Specifically, designated officers are
instructed to issue reports regarding the treatment of personally iden-
tifiable information to an intermediate entity within their own agency:
the inspector general. This precludes any independent relationship
with Congress through which they could enlist such an external, le-
gitimacy-enhancing oversight function. While the DHS CPO, further-
more, might take advantage of OMB's lack of interest in privacy, the
absence of executive oversight resulting from President Bush's re-
moval of the high-level centralized policy management function from
within OMB'°  both limits pressure on other agencies' privacy officers
to perform PIAs and also reduces the power of individual privacy of-
ficers to respond to agency resistance by pointing to external require-
ments to bolster their internal legitimacy.
The DHS experience underscores scholarship that emphasizes
independence in action and reporting as essential components of ef-
fective government data-protection offices. 2 In the case of DHS at
political dimension, and there are advantages to having a political appointee rather than a civil
servant articulate the privacy issues, both within the Administration and in public").
100 Pub L No 108-447, 118 Stat 2809,3268-70, codified at 5 USC § 552(a) note.
101 See the Center for Democracy & Technology, Public Interest Groups and Academics
(cited in note 69).
102 See, for example, Robert Gellman, A Better Way to Approach Privacy Policy in the
United States: Establish a Non-regulatory Privacy Protection Board, 54 Hastings L J 1183,1208-10
(2003) (emphasizing the importance of independence for the success of the Privacy Protection
Board); Letter from Center for Democracy & Technology to OMB Information Policy Commit-
tee (July 29, 1997), online at http://www.cdt.org/privacy/ntia.html (visited Jan 12, 2008) (recom-
mending a body for privacy oversight that would be "an independent voice empowered with the
scope, expertise, and authority to guide public policy"); Schwartz, 43 Hastings L J at 1379-84
(cited in note 61) (arguing that an independent data protection body could develop expertise
and specialization currently missing in congressional oversight); David H. Flaherty, Protecting
Privacy in Surveillance Societies 381 (UNC 1989) (concluding that independent agency oversight
is "essential" to make a data protection law work in practice); Simitis, 135 U Pa L Rev at 742
(cited in note 53) ("Efficient regulation presupposes the establishment of an independent con-
trol authority. Experience confirms what was argued in the earliest debates: a mandatory frame-
work for data processing is not sufficient."); Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
Secretary's Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems, Records, Computers and
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the time of the US-VISIT PIA, that independence enabled the CPO
to argue that privacy was an integral component of the institution's core
mission.'3 It enabled the CPO to act relatively autonomously, particu-
larly with respect to issuing reports on agency actions and investiga-
tions, thereby establishing an independent voice and relationships with
external oversight bodies. Finally, it provided the political capital and
access necessary to create a new independent, external quasi-oversight
mechanism comprised of privacy and security experts, thereby securing
an additional mechanism to ensure that agency actions and commit-
ments affecting privacy were examined. These three actions were likely
heavily dependent on the status of the CPO and in turn positively influ-
enced the US-VISIT PIAs and other work of the office.'°'
2. Expert personnel, integrated structure, and the PIA tool.
Kelly further leveraged her individual capacity to affect deci-
sionmaking within the agency through decisions about both personnel
and structure. In particular, Kelly both assembled a staff of demon-
strated privacy professionals with diverse disciplinary skills and lo-
cated these employees not only in the central DHS privacy office, but
embedded them as well within the operational units throughout the
agency. This combination of privacy expertise, varied training and per-
spective, and decentralized integration throughout decisionmaking
structures, was particularly well suited to take advantage of the pri-
vacy impact assessment mechanism, an inherently interdisciplinary
tool for affecting decisionmaking from the "bottom up."
Like Kelly, several key privacy office staff had held prior posi-
tions that required them to identify emerging privacy issues proac-
tively and engage a wide range of businesses in the development of
privacy policy and implementation of privacy management strate-
gies. ' Several staff members had been involved in negotiations with
the Rights of Citizens 42-43 (1973) (concluding that agency oversight was the strongest option
for protecting privacy but rejecting it due to lack of political support).
103 In fact, OMB guidance left it up to the agency whether to conduct a PIA at all where the
personal information at issue was about aliens. See OMB, Guidance (cited in note 8) ("Agencies
may, consistent with individual practice, choose to extend the protections of the Privacy Act and
E-Government Act to businesses, sole proprietors, aliens, etc.").
104 A study of environmental regulation found that the effectiveness of the unit charged
with environmental protection depends on its own commitment to the program, its autonomy,
the outside support for its efforts, and the clarity of its goals. See Taylor, Making Bureaucracies
Think at 252 (cited in note 43) (discussing requirements for agency institutionalization of envi-
ronmental values).
105 For example, Maureen Cooney, Chief of Staff and Director of International Privacy
Policy, was Legal Advisor for International Consumer Protection at the FTC where she worked
on international privacy and security issues; Elizabeth Whitnell, Chief Counsel to the Privacy
Office, was a lawyer at the Office of Information and Privacy at the DOJ; Peter Sand, Director of
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the European Union about the adequacy of United States privacy law
and practice, which provided them with a deep familiarity with the
larger trade and political context of agency privacy decisions. Kelly
specifically identified the breadth of her core privacy staff-lawyers,
technologists, government insiders, implementation and education
experts-and their connections and experiences as essential to the
success of the office. ° Unlike other agencies' CPO offices, which grew
out of the compliance-focused Privacy Act and Freedom of Informa-
tion Act offices, the DHS CPO office was staffed with individuals who
possessed the inclination and capacity to build on the opportunity
presented by the PIA process to identify problems with emerging
technology, distinguish policy tradeoffs in technology design choices,
and present alternative strategies.
Several members of the DHS CPO staff, moreover, were active
participants in professional associations and conferences. 'O, The
growth of professional organizations in the privacy field-some aimed
at self-regulation, some at information sharing, and some at the crea-
tion of a professional field- has played an important role in defining
the activities and standards to which CPOs should aspire.'° The influ-
ence of privacy professionals on one another, and the relative weight
placed on the policies and practices of others is increased by the rela-
tively ambiguous nature of success in this volatile but thinly regulated
Privacy Technology, was the Chief Privacy and Information Officer for the Pennsylvania Office
of the Attorney General; Toby Levin, the Senior Advisor to the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity Privacy Office, was a Senior Attorney in the Division of Financial Practices at the FTC,
where she worked on children's privacy and financial privacy, among other issues; and Rebecca
Richards, Director of Privacy Compliance at the Department of Homeland Security, was Direc-
tor of Policy and Compliance at a privacy certification program (TRUSTe) and worked on the
US-European Union Safe Harbor accord while an international trade specialist at the US De-
partment of Commerce.
106 See Kelly Interview (cited in note 95).
107 Members of the Privacy Office were regular presenters at meetings of the International
Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP), the leading privacy professional association. For
example, Nuala O'Connor Kelly was the keynote at the IAPP 2004 Privacy and Data Security
Summit and Exposition; Rebecca Richards and Lisa Dean, Privacy Officers at the TSA, part of
DHS, both spoke at the 2005 IAPP summit; and this summer Senior Privacy Advisor Toby Levin,
International Privacy Policy Director John Kropf, Privacy Technology Director Peter Sand, and
Privacy Compliance Director Rebecca Richards all participated in a panel discussion at the
IAPP Privacy Summit 2007.
108 The professionalization of a field often yields what has been termed "normative isomor-
phism," the standardizing effect that professional training, education, and networks exert on
organizational behavior. See Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited:
Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 Am Soc Rev
147, 152-53 (1983) (describing how professionals in a field look for candidates similar to them-
selves when doing new hiring). In interviews conducted for the authors' larger study of corporate
Chief Privacy Officers, Catalyzing Privacy: Comprehensive Compliance Regimes under Incomplete
Law (cited in note 1), privacy officers routinely point to their peers and professional privacy organi-
zations as important sources that inform their own and their institutions approach to privacy.
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area.' 9 The lack of inherent substantive standards for measurement in
the privacy arena creates greater dependence upon peers and profes-
sional associations for direction, metrics, and validation. The importa-
tion of experts with substantial ties to the broader privacy community
brought a strong emphasis on detailed risk analysis and issue identifi-
cation into the PIA structure at DHS, developed through information
sharing with peers and past professional experience. The expectations
of the broader privacy community became a source of external input
and pressure, as well as a source of knowledge and a forum for itera-
tive program design, on the DHS CPO through the office's employ-
ees' ties to this community.
Kelly believed it essential to embed privacy personnel within the
operational units of DHS, and, in addition to her core privacy staff,
each of the operational divisions-and even particular programs that
raised heightened privacy concerns, such as US-VISIT-had dedicated
privacy officers. 0 Privacy professionals in the private sector inter-
viewed by the authors, as well as other privacy professionals, stress the
importance of embedding expertise within business units and estab-
lishing specific staff who are personally responsible for privacy-
typically through indirect reporting mechanisms-as essential to op-
erationalizing privacy in large decentralized organizations."' Litera-
ture on the relationship between formal structures and successful de-
109 A second form of isomorphism, "mimetic isomorphism," results from uncertainty. Where
goals are ambiguous and success difficult to measure, organizations will more readily tend to-
ward imitating others in the field who appear to be successful. This mimicry in the face of uncer-
tainty appears to be another substantial force in standardizing organizational responses to issues
such as privacy. See DiMaggio and Powell, 48 Am Soc Rev at 151-52 (cited in note 108) (noting
that organizations tend to model themselves after similar organizations in their field that they
perceive to be more legitimate or successful). This effect also finds support in the authors' ongo-
ing study of CPOs.
h0 See, for example, DHS, Naturalization Redesign Test Pilot Privacy Impact Assessment
(2007), online at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy-pia-uscisnrtp.pdf (visited
Jan 12, 2008); TSA, Airport Access Control Pilot Project Privacy Impact Assessment 6 (2004),
online at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy-pia-aacpp.pdf (visited Jan 12, 2008);
DHS, US-VISIT Program at 10 (cited in note 85).
M1 See Kelly interview (cited in note 95); Bamberger and Mulligan, Catalyzing Privacy
(cited in note 1); David H. Flaherty, Privacy Impact Assessments: An Essential Tool for Data
Protection (presented at the Twenty-second Annual Meeting of Privacy and Data Protection
Officials, 2000), online at http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/datacncl/flaherty.htm (visited Jan 12, 2008) ("I
conclude that the ideal privacy impact assessment of any project is prepared by someone from
inside the project and with an up-front demonstration of just how it works or is supposed to
work."); Blair Stewart, Privacy Impact Assessment Towards a Better Informed Process for Evalu-
ating Privacy Issues Arising from New Technologies, 5 Privacy L & Policy Rep 147 (1999) ("PIA
needs to be integrated into decision-making processes. For a government proposal, PIA might be
integrated into departmental decision-making and appropriate cabinet processes. The important
thing is that PIA not be divorced from decision-making processes.").
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centralized decisionmaking, moreover, further supports this claim, ' as
do studies of cognition and decisionmaking, which emphasize "inter-
action with others whose thought processes are not governed by the
same culture or knowledge structures as the decision maker" as a
principal means of forcing integration of secondary concerns in ten-
sion with an organization's existing focus.'
Kelly's personnel decisions, then, reflected an attempt to break
down traditional boundaries, both disciplinary and institutional. Par-
ticularly, as here, where the secondary mandate requires expertise out-
side the realm of agency culture, the introduction of specialized per-
sonnel-a privacy infrastructure -is a necessary prerequisite for suc-
cess. PIAs, a form of technology assessment... first pioneered in New
Zealand and Canada in the mid-1990s,"5 seek to elicit risks that cannot
be identified through a legal lens alone, but also implicate "moral[,]
ethical," and policy tradeoffs in technology design choices.1 6 As such,
they have been lauded for moving privacy decisions from a bureau-
cratic framework of compliance with "fair information practices," to
deeper risk analyses and broader engagement of diverse constituents
112 W. Richard Scott, Organizations: Rational, Natural and Open Systems 262-63 (Prentice
Hall 4th ed 1998) (discussing scholarship suggesting that centralization and formalization may be
viewed as alternative control mechanisms: more formalized arrangements permit more decen-
tralized decisionmaking).
113 Bamberger, 56 Duke L J at 443 (cited in note 38), citing Chip Heath, Richard P. Larrick,
and Joshua Klayman, Cognitive Repairs: How Organizational Practices Can Compensate for
Individual Shortcomings, 20 Rsrch Org Beh 1, 20 (1998) ("Often, organizations ensure that
individuals weigh information effectively by forcing them to interact with others who might
weigh the information differently."); James P Walsh, Managerial and Organizational Cognition:
Notes from a Trip Down Memory Lane, 6 Org Sci 280, 291 (1995) ("[R]esearch on the process of
knowledge structure development suggests that a dramatically altered information environment
is often the locus of knowledge structure change.").
114 Technology assessments aim to provide a framework for identifying and exploring the
potential implications of different technological and system choices within and during techno-
logical development. Technology assessments are part of the broader research on the social
shaping of technology (SST), which aims to view technology as sites of social interaction, politics,
and power. A primary goal of the discipline is to demystify and democratize decisions about
technology and to subject them, like other forms of power, to social accountability and control.
PLAs that introduce other values into the conversation about technology selection, design, and
deployment are a specific manifestation of this work. For a brief overview of the SST literature,
see generally Robin Williams and David Edge, The Social Shaping of Technology, 25 Rsrch Pol-
icy 865 (1996).
115 See generally Stewart, 5 Privacy L & Policy Rep 147 (cited in note 111) (noting that
PLAs have been implemented in jurisdictions of New Zealand since the early 1990s); Office of
the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Fact Sheet: Privacy Impact Assessments (2003), online at
http://www.privcom.gc.ca/fs-fi/02 05_d_33 e.asp (visited Jan 12, 2008) (detailing principles and
procedures for conducting PLAs in Canada).
116 Flaherty, Privacy Impact (cited in note 111) (describing the interaction between privacy advo-
cates and data collection system designers as cooperative and necessary for improved comprehension).
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in a privacy dialogue. Optimal use of this new tool required the inter-
disciplinary staff assembled in the DHS privacy office.
3. Creating accountability in the absence of oversight: the Data
Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee.
Finally, the US-VISIT process was conducted in the context of a
third important factor unique to DHS: the establishment of DPIAC, a
federal advisory committee created in 2004 to oversee DHS privacy
activities.11 7 The enhanced accountability made possible through the
creation of this external quasi-oversight board strengthened and pub-
licized DHS privacy office processes and substantive decisions, thus
enabling the office to further its subgoal within the agency.
Faced with a relative void in external oversight mechanisms
geared to ensure compliance with privacy directives and the need to
strengthen privacy's position within the conflicting DHS missions, Kelly
requested Secretary Ridge's support to establish the DPIAC early on.
She credits him with understanding that the creation of a "structure for
consistent oversight by privacy and security experts" was essential for
the office and the agency as a whole to both establish credibility and
formalize the conversation about "what is a reasonable amount of gov-
ernment data collection even in the most extreme circumstances." 8
The Committee, which met quarterly and set its own agenda, was
comprised of privacy and security experts from the public and private
sectors with sophisticated knowledge of technology and privacy. With
the exception of one individual, none of the members fall into the
category of privacy "advocates." Rather, they were respected indi-
viduals within corporate America and academia with sound privacy
and security credentials. "9 Their ties to industry, the defense sector,
and academia gave them particular force when they spoke to a privacy
or security issue.
The DPIAC created a consistent form of oversight, pulling DHS
officials from various departmental units to discuss privacy and secu-
rity issues within specific projects. Importantly, the ability of the
DPIAC to engage in a rather freewheeling review of DHS activity
117 See DHS Privacy Office, Data Integrity, Privacy, and Interoperability Advisory Commit-
tee, 69 Fed Reg 18923, 18923 (2004).
118 Kelly Interview (cited in note 95).
119 See DHS, Department of Homeland Security Announces Appointments to Data Privacy
and Integrity Advisory Committee (Feb 23, 2005), online at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/
pressrelease_0625.shtm (visited Jan 12, 2008) (listing initial appointees and noting that "mem-
bers of this Advisory Committee have diverse expertise in privacy, security, and emerging tech-
nology, and come from large and small companies, the academic community, and the non-profit
sector ... [and] also reflect a depth of knowledge on issues of data protection, openness, technol-
ogy, and national security").
[75:75
Privacy Decisionmaking in Administrative Agencies
introduced an external expert quasi-oversight body to whom agency
personnel, including those within operational divisions, had to account
for their actions and decisions. Research into the psychology of ac-
countability indicates the benefits of this type of review, in which deci-
sionmakers are required to explain themselves to others whose views
they do not know in advance." In particular, such accountability "mo-
tivates" people "to anticipate the counterarguments that potential crit-
ics could raise to their positions."' 121 It develops tolerance for cognitive
inconsistency, so that a decisionmaker recognizes good features of re-
jected policies and bad features of accepted policies. It fosters a greater
awareness of the cognitive processes underlying the decision. Finally, it
counters the reliance on "existing knowledge structures in interpreting
new information," making decisionmakers more willing to revise initial
impressions of the situation in response to changing evidence22
DRAWING CONCLUSIONS
Drawing on certain structures established by statute, internal
high-level agency support, and an approach to personnel and expertise
drawn from professional experience, the DHS CPO was able to manu-
facture the conditions for meaningful privacy impact assessment im-
plementation in the absence of external oversight. Subsequent events
within DHS combine with the differential cross-agency PIA perform-
ance, however, to underscore the contingency of such an outcome.
Structurally, on his appointment, new DHS Secretary Michael Cher-
toff created an office for central oversight of agency policy, including
privacy, drawing authority away from the separate privacy office123
Operationally, after a ten-month vacancy following Kelly's resigna-
tion, the CPO post was filled with Hugo Teufel III, a less-activist pro-
ponent of his office's authority who had little expertise with privacy
policy beyond Privacy Act notices and FOIA requests, and weak ties
with the privacy profession outside government. 124
120 See, for example, Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability: The Neglected Social Context of
Judgment and Choice, in Barry M. Staw and L.L. Cummings, eds, 7 Rsrch Org Beh 297, 314-21
(1985) (reviewing research on heuristics and stating that accountability can cultivate sensitivity
to complex thinking practices under certain circumstances).
121 Id at 314, 316.
122 Id.
123 DHS also appointed Stewart Baker to the agency's lead policy position. Baker was
formerly general counsel to the National Security Agency and a longtime and powerful influence
for flexibility in government power. See DHS, Assistant Secretary for Policy: Stewart A. Baker,
online at http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/biography-0135.shtm (visited Jan 12,2008).
124 See Marc Rotenberg, The Sui Generis Privacy Agency: How the United States Institution-
alized Privacy Oversight after 9-11 15 (SSRN Working Paper Series, 2006), online at http://pa-
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In this light, our preliminary analysis suggests several factors that
are worth further examination as means to institutionalize meaningful
PIA compliance so as to reduce discretion and instability across con-
text and time: (1) the independence of privacy decisionmakers within
the agency structure; (2) external oversight largely unfettered by po-
litical and technical barriers; and (3) the incorporation of multiper-
spective analysis throughout decisions about information technology.
The statutory measures Congress successfully uses to control, ex
ante, the exercise of bureaucratic discretion and overcome shortcom-
ings of ex post oversight12 seem particularly well suited to creating
structures that institutionalize the independence of the agency privacy
function. In particular, the RFID experience suggests the importance
of reporting both directly to the agency head in order to preserve
status as against other agency subunits, and to Congress, enhancing
autonomy from both the agency and the executive branch more
broadly by creating a means of dotted-line access to legislative, public,
and press oversight on the inclusion of secondary mandates like pri-
vacy, which may encounter systemic resistance by the primary sub-
stantive goals around which agencies are otherwise organized. One
such proposal before Congress dealing specifically with the DHS
CPO-the Privacy Officer with Enhanced Rights Act of 200712-
would create these statutory safeguards, as well as privacy office inves-
tigatory power to access all agency documents and subpoena private
sector materials and agency reporting requirements if the privacy offi-
cer is transferred or removed from office.
The PIA experience's lessons about the importance of, and barri-
ers to, external oversight further resonate with a corpus of work by
privacy scholars and professionals advocating the establishment of an
independent agency to oversee the development and implementation
of privacy policy. 1 7 While these general lessons do not speak to the
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=933690 (visited Jan 12, 2008) (discussing the contro-
versy over Teufel's appointment).
125 See McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 75 Va L Rev at 481 (cited in note 52) (emphasizing
the opportunities to control bureaucracies through ex ante regulation); Barry R. Weingast and
Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by
the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J Polit Econ 765, 780-92 (1983) (providing empirical evidence
demonstrating that Congress can control regulatory policymaking without active monitoring).
126 S 332, 110th Cong, 1st Sess (Jan 18, 2007) (proposing to amend the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 to clarify the investigative authorities of the privacy officer of the Department of
Homeland Security).
127 See, for example, Simitis, 135 U Pa L Rev at 742-43 (cited in note 53) ("Efficient regula-
tion presupposes the establishment of an independent control authority."); Flaherty, Protecting
Privacy in Surveillance Societies at 381 (cited in note 102) (declaring that the most important
finding of a five-country privacy study is that "an agency charged with implementation is essen-
tial to make the law work in practice").
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comparative merits of various iterations proposed,2 ' they do suggest
the importance of external accountability as a means for strengthen-
ing the hand of privacy officers internally, the role of connections with
the privacy profession for enhancing the legitimacy and effectiveness
of an oversight institution, and the need for substantive technical ex-
pertise in the review of privacy and technology decisions. While such
an independent oversight entity might, as in the case of the Council on
Environmental Quality's NEPA oversight,'29 arise from executive
branch initiative, the problems of changing presidential commitment
and the incongruity between individual congressional committee ju-
risdictions and cross-agency privacy directives experienced in the PIA
analysis suggest codification in statute both as a commitment measure
and as a means for rationalizing oversight.
Finally, the RFID cases suggest the importance of staffing capac-
ity and structure around privacy and, in particular, integrating privacy
expertise in both centralized and distributed form into policymaking.
More specifically, it suggests the role of interdisciplinary teams in pri-
vacy impact assessments and the need for both a central, high-status
privacy office and the embedding of individuals charged with seeing
through a privacy lens throughout agency subunits.
These final suggestions underscore the limits of formal law in op-
erationalizing privacy; the successful integration of privacy concerns
into agency decisionmaking poses, at least in part, a challenge of man-
agement-of personnel, structures, and processes. They also reflect, it
must be noted, some tension in the broader-brush implications we
have drawn from the PIA and RFID experience. Enhancing privacy
function independence, for example, is inherently in tension with both
integrating that function within teams and units, and increasing its
status by creating direct agency-head reporting. Strong monitoring
mindsets, moreover, tend to cancel out more cooperative impulses to-
wards coordination between disciplines and units."° Yet, at a minimum,
these preliminary indicators of barriers and aids to accountability
strongly recommend the promise of broader qualitative and context-
dependent analysis of efforts, from within and without administrative
agencies, to implement privacy and technology policy specifically, and
integrate secondary goals in agency decisionmaking more generally.
128 Compare Gellman, 54 Hastings L J at 1215-19 (cited in note 102) (calling for a nonregu-
latory, independent federal privacy board for promoting "Fair Information Practices" in the
public and private sectors), with Letter from Center for Democracy & Technology (cited in note
102) (advocating for an Office of Privacy and Technology Assessment with broad powers).
129 See text accompanying notes 40-47.
130 See Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Com-
pliance with Law, 2002 Colum Bus L Rev 71,96 (2002).
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